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an interference with the government, are Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust
Co., 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673, which involved the obligations of the
federal government sold to raise public funds; Ambrosini v. United States,
187 U. S. 1, 23 Sup. Ct. 1, where surety bonds were exacted by the state
government in the exercise of its police power; and Gillespie v. Oklahoma,
257 U. S. 501, 42 Sup. Ct. 171, a strict case, which decided that when the
instrumentality is so intimately connected with the necessary functions of
the government as to fall within the exemption, the immunity extends to
the income derived from the instrumentality. In Panhandle Oil Co. V.
Miss., 277 U. S. 218, 48 Sup. Ct. 451, it was decided that a state tax on
gasoline sold by dealers was illegal so far as it applied to gasoline sold by
those dealers to the United States coast guard fleet and to the United States
Veterans' Hospital. In this opinion the court said: "The states may not
burden or interfere with the exertion of national power or make it a source
of revenue or take the funds raised or tax the means used for the perform-
ance of federal functions.... While Mississippi may impose charges upon
petitioner for the privilege of carrying on trade that is subject to the
power of the state, it may not lay any tax upon transactions by which the
United States secures the things desired for its governmental purposes."
Mr. Justice Holmes, together with three other justices, dissented: "When
the government comes into a state to purchase I do not perceive why it
should be entitled to stand differently from any other purchaser. The ques-
tion of interference with government is one of reasonableness and degree
and it seems to me that the interference in this case is too remote." Certainly
this is a borderline case difficult to reconcile with the principal case, for in
each the interference seems equally remote. In the principal case, however,
the court did not seem to have much difficulty in perceiving this, for speak-
ing through Mr. Justice McReynolds, who dissented in the Panhandle case,
it said: "There was no tax on the contract for such carriage (of the
mails) ; the burden laid upon the property employed affected operations of
the federal government only remotely." J. W. S.
CONFLICT OF LAwS--PRESUMPTION OF FOREIGN LAW-INDIANA CASES
AND THE RESTATEMENT-There are some fifty or more reported Indiana
cases in which presumption of foreign law is considered, yet this point has
not been satisfactorily settled. In several of the cases, which have been
subsequently cited as precedent and made the basis of a later decision, the
remarks of the court upon this question are purely dicta and in no respect
necessary to the decision of the case in which they appear. And other cases
are found to indicate, by the language employed, that a certain rule is the
prevailing one while following a different rule in actual decision.
The rule supported by the majority of the cases is the general American
rule that in the absence of any showing to the contrary the presumption is
that the common law prevails in the foreign state. Titus V. Scantling, 4
Blackf. 89 (1835); Trimble v. Trimble, 2 Ind. 76 (1850); Cunningham v.
Jacobs, 120 Ind. 306 (1889); Gates v. Newman, 18 Ind. App. 392 (1897);
Penn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Norcross, 163 Ind. 379 (1904); Baltimore &
Ohio R. Co. v,. Freeze, 169 Ind. 370 (1907); Southern R. Co. v. Elliott, 170
Ind. 273 (1907); Cobe v. Malloy, 44 Ind. App. 8 (1909); Wallace v. Thomp-
son, 49 Ind. App. 211 (1911); W. MeMillen & Son a. Hall, 59 Ind. App. 545
RECENT CASE NOTES
(1915); Cleveland, etc. R. Co. v. Wolf, 114 N. E. 236 (App. Ct., 1916);
Swain v. Schild, 66 Ind. App. 156 (1917); Chalmers & Williams v. Surprise,
70 Ind. App. 646 (1919); Henning v. Hill, 80 Ind. App. 363 (1923).
This rule has even been applied in many cases where the Indiana law on
the subject is statutory. Stout v. Wood, 1 Blackf. 71 (1820); Johnson v.
Chambers, 12 Ind. 102 (1859); Engler v. Ellis, 16 Ind. 475 (1861); Men-
denhall v. Gately, 18 Ind. 149 (1862); Crake v. Crake, 18 Ind. 156 (1862);
Buckinghouse v. Gregg, 19 Ind. 401 (1862); Smith v. The Muncie National
Bank, 29 Ind. 158 (1867); Schurman v. Marley, 29 Ind. 458 (1868); Lich-
tenberger v. Graham, 50 Ind. 288 (1875); Alford v. Baker, 53 Ind. 279
(1876); Smith v. Peterson, 63 Ind. 243 (1878); Robards v. Marley, 80 Ind.
185 (1881); Rogers v. Zook, 86 Ind. 237 (1882); Supreme Council v. Gar-
rigus, 104 Ind. 133 (1885); Jackson v. Pittsburgh, etc. Ry., 140 Ind. 241
(1894); B. & 0. R. Co. v. Reed, 158 Ind. 25 (1901); B. & 0. R. Co. v. Jones,
158 Ind. 87 (1901); B. & 0. R. Co. v. Adams, 159 Ind. 689 (1902); B. & 0.
R. Co. v. Hollenbeck, 161 Ind. 452 (1903); Midland Steel Co. v. Citizens
Nat. Bank, 34 Ind. App. 107 (Dictum, 1904); Wabash R. Co. v. Hassett,
170 Ind. 370 (1907); Crume v. Brightwell, 69 Ind. App. 668 (1918); Culp
v. Butler, 69 Ind. 668 (1918); Clark v. Southern Ry. Co., 69 Ind. App. 697
(1918); Gates v. Fauvre, 74 Ind. App. 382 (1920).
An exception to this rule is indicated, by way of dictum, in Buchanan
v. Hubbard, 119 Ind. 187 (1889) to the effect that in respect to those states
or territories in which the common law did not prevail prior to their en-
trance into the Union it will not be presumed that the common law is in
force there now but that the law in such state is the same as that of the
forum. And in Krouse v. Krouse, 48 Ind. App. 3 (1911) in which the law
of California was involved the rule was laid down that the court having
judicial notice of the fact that the civil law once prevailed in California
the presumption that the common law prevails there is removed and there-
fore the case must, as a matter of necessity, be decided in accordance with
the laws of Indiana. The court declares that this case falls within the rule
laid down in Buchanan v. Hubbard, supra, but, although in practical effect
they are the same, there is technically a difference in these two rules. The
former presumes the laws of the two states to be the same while the latter
recognizes, logically, the absence of any presumption and the application of
the law of the forum as a matter of necessity. This latter is a logical re-
sult of the general rule above stated.
A second rule, and one which is directly contra to the rule presuming
that the common law prevails, is laid down in a number of cases that it
will be presumed, in the absence of any showing to the contrary, that the
foreign law is the same as the law of the forum. Shaw v. Wood (dictum)
8 Ind. 518 (1856); Draggoo v. Graham (dictum), 9 Ind. 212 (1857);
Farhni v. Ramsee (dictum), 19 Ind. 400 (1862); Buchanan V. Hubbard,
119 Ind. 187 (1889); Bierhaus v. Western Union Tel. Co., 8 Ind. App. 246
(1893); Cooley v. Kelley, 52 Ind. App. 687 (1912); Irose v. Balla, 181 Ind.
49 (1913); Spieliman v. Herskovitz, 78 Ind. App. 131 (1921). And to the
same effect there is the rule that where there is no common law on the sub-
ject and the foreign law is not shown the law of Indiana will be applied.
Hollman v. Collins, 1 Ind. 24 (1848) ; Blystone v. Burgett. (dictum), 10 Ind.
28 (1857); Crake v. Crake (dictum), 18 Ind. 156 (1862); Patterson v.
Carrell, 60 Ind. 128 (1877). Since if there was no common law on the sub-
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ject there would have been no cause of action or defense at common law
this is in effect the same rule as the second rule stated above.
In Crake v. Crake, supra, it was held that where a contract, governed
by foreign law, embraces terms upon a subject not settled by the common
law and no statute of the foreign state is shown the courts of this state
will presume such contract valid. And Cunningham v. Jacobs, supra, which
was an action upon an attachment bond executed in Illinois, held that al-
though a writ of attachment is the creature of statute law and was un-
known to the common law yet where a court of a state in which the com-
mon law is presumed to prevail has issued such a writ it will be presumed
that the proceeding was valid and that the court did not exceed its powers
since "it is always to be presumed that everything was rightly done in court
unless the contrary expressly appears by the record."
In view of the state of the authority in Indiana it would be a simple
matter to adhere to the rules set out in the Tentative Draft No. 5 of the
Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws which was submitted for dis-
cussion at the seventh annual meeting of The American Law Institute, May
9, 1929. They are as follows:
"Section 654. FOREIGN COMMON LAW. In the absence of evidence, the
common law of another common law state is presumed to be the same as the
common law of the forum.
Section 655. FOREIGN STATUTORY LAW. In the absence of evidence,
there is no presumption that a particular statute exists in another state.
Section 656. PRESuMPTION As To FOREIGN LAW. In the absence of evi-
dence, the law of a state not governed by the system of the common law will
not be presumed to be like that of the forum."
Obviously these rules do not cover the whole problem but they are in
accord with the majority of the Indiana cases. S. J. S.
CRIMINAL LAw-CONVICTION or LEssER CRIME UNDER INDICTMENT FOR
A GREATER-Defendant below was indicted on a charge of rape of a female
under the age of sixteen, and was convicted of the crime of encouraging the
delinquency of a female under eighteen. The case was appealed on the
question of whether the crime charged so included the one of which de-
fendant was convicted as to permit conviction of the lesser under an indict-
ment on the greater. The court held such conviction contrary to law, and
reasoned as follows: The crime of which defendant is found guilty must
be a degree of the crime as charged, or must be necessarily included in the
offense charged; otherwise there can be no conviction of the lesser crime.
(1) Since rape was not divided into degrees at the time of defendant's trial,
conviction under the first requirement was impossible. (2) As to the alter-
native requirement, contributing to delinquency is not necessarily included
in the offense charged. For it may be accomplished without a touching,
whereas rape cannot be; and it may be committed without assault, assault
and battery, or intent to commit rape, but merely with the intent to en-
courage the girl to submit to commission of the act by a third person. This
is not rape. Gouchenour v. State, Sup. Ct. of Ind., Oct. 29, 1930; 173 N.
E. 191.
The case was .obviously decided according to the weight of authority.
Watson v. State, 116 Ga. 607, 43 S. E. 32; Reynolds v. People, 83 Ill. 479,
